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This paper considers stochastic non-cooperative countable-person games 
with countable state space and compact action spaces. Under some continuity 
assumptions on the payoff functions and the transition probabilities it is 
shown in section 2 that under the discounted criterium there exists an 
equilibrium point within the class of stationary strategies. 
Next in section 3 we show for the most general class of stochastic 
games, under the only condition that the payoffs should be uniform bounded, 
that, if there exists an equilibrium point within a subclass of the station-
ary strategies, which has the property that all the players pure stationary 
strategies belong to these subclass, then this point is also equilibrium 
point within the most gen~ral class of strategies. 
KEY WORDS & PHRASES: Stochastic game, non-cooperative-game, countable-person 
game, discounted payoff model, equilibrium point, 
optimal stationary strategies, most general stochastic 
game with most general strategy spaces. 

l • INTRODUCTION 
This paper treats a countable-person non-cooperative stochastic game, 
specified by a five-tuple r = (I,S,A,g,P) 
I the set of players 
S the state space 
A= X X A.(s), where A.(s) is the set from which player i in states 
SES iEI i i 
will take his actions. 
g = {g. I i EI}. Let A(s) = X A.(s) and SA= {(s,a) I a E A(s)} 
1 iEI 1 
I then g . SA + lR , Vi E I. 
i 
g.(s,a(s)) is the immediate payoff to player i if in states the joint 
i 
players action is a(s) E A(s). 
P = {p(Hls, a(s)) I VH E BS, V(s,a(s)) E SA}, where BS is the a-algebra of 
Borel subsets of S. Pis the set of transition probabilities. For each 
(s,a(s)) E SA is p(•ls,a(s)) a probability measure on S defined for 
each HE BS. p(Hjs,a(s)) denotes the probability that the next state is 
an element of H, if in states the players joint action is a(s). 
We make the following assumptions on these game parameters: 
I is a countable set 
Sis a countable set 
A.(s) is a compact subset of some metric space, Vs ES, Vi EI. 
i , 
g.(.,.) E V(SA) (V(SA) will be defined below) 
i 
and sup I g.(s,a(s))j ~ M, Vi EI. 
SA 1 
As : p (s I I • , • ) E V (SA), Vs I E s. 
Let M(S) be the class of all bounded real valued functions on S. Let C(A(s')) 
be the class of continuous real-valued functions on A.(s), Vs ES. 
i 
Let V(SA) be the class of functions such that f E V(SA) iff f SA+ lR1 
and f(•,a(•)) E M(S), Va(•) EA and f(s,•) E C(A(s)), Vs ES. 
Behaviorally the game runs as follows: 
An initial state sO ES is specified; simultaneously each player i EI 
chooses an action ai(sO) E Ai(sO); to player i there takes place an imme-
diate payoff gi(sO,a(sO)) where a(sO) = (a1(sO),a2(sO), ••••.. ); 
2 
the game moves according to the probability measure p(.ls0 ,a(s0)) to a new 
state s 1, which may be viewed as a new starting state, etc. 
Let M.(s) be the set of all Borel subsets of A.(s), Vs ES, Vi EI. 
1 1 
We now define a mixed action for player i in states as a probability mea-
sure µi(s) on Ai(s), defined for each HE Mi(s). 
Let N.(s) be the set of all mixed actions for player i in states, Vs ES, 
1 
Vi EI, endowed with the weak topology (see e.g. PARTHASARATHY [7], page 39). 
Since Ai(s) is compact metric it follows from PARTHASARATHY [6] (theorem 
6.4, page 45) that N.(s) is compact in the weak topology and can be metrized. 
1 
Let N(s) = X N. (s). From Tychonoff's theorem (e.g. ROYDEN [9] page 166) 
. I i 1E 
we see that N(s) is compact in the product topolgy. N(s) is· the set of pro-
duct measures defined on the product a-algebra on A(s). As N.(s) is compact 
1 
and can be metrized we note from KELLEY [6] (theorem 17, page 125) that the 
weak topology on N.(s) satisfies the first axiom of countability. But then 
1 
also N(s) satisfies the first axiom of countability, which ensures that 
the topology of N(s) can be characterized by sequences (see KELLEY [6], 
theorem 8, page 72). An element of N(s) will be denoted by 
µ(s) = (µ 1 (s),µ 2 (s), •••.•• ). If in states the players joint mixed actions 
are µ(s), then the expected immediate payoff g.(s,µ(s)) to player i equals: 
1 
I.I. gi(s,µ(s)) = f gi(s,a(s) dµ(s) 
A(s) 
Vi EI. 
In the same way we can express the expectation of the transition probabi-
lities under µ(s) E N(s): 
p(s' ls,µ(s)) = J p(s' ls,a(s)) dµ(s), 
A(s) 
Vs' ES. 
A stationary strategy for 
that µ.(s) E N.(s), i.e. every 
player i is a mappingµ. defined on S, such 
1 
1 1 
time the play stays in states, player i 
plays mixed action µ.(s), Vs ES. 
1 
A joint stationary strategy for the players is a mappingµ defined on S, 
such that µ(s) = (µ 1(s),µ 2(s), .••••• ) E N(s), Vs ES. 
Let N. = 
l. 





In the same way as with the space N(s) above we can show that both N. and N 
l. 
are compact in the product topology and both topologies satisfy the first 
axiom of countability, so both topologies are characterized by sequences. 
An element of N. represents a stationary strategy for player i and conversely. 
l. 
An element of N represents a joint stationary strategy for the players and 
conversely. 
In section 2 we only consider stationary strategies. In section 3 we 
also allow non-stationary strategies and they will be defined there. 
Let F.(s) be the set 
l. 
of all finite signed measures on A.(s), defined for 
]. 
each H E M. ( s) 
l. 
endowed with the we¥ topology. In VRIEZE [II], le11DD.a 2.1, it 
is proven that F.(s) is a linear topological space. 
l. 
Let F(s) = X F.(s) and F = X F(s), then Fis in the product topology 
iEI l. SES 
again a linear Hausdorff topological space and N is a compact convex subset 
of F. 
In this paper we consider the discounted model, so there is specified 
th a discount factor 8 E [0,1) i.e. a payoff on the t -step to player i will 
t be discounted with a factor f3, t = 0,1,2, •••• 
t th Let Vi(s0,µ) denote the expected payoff to player i at the t -step when the 
play is started_ in s0 and the players use stationary strategy µ E N, 
t = 0,1,2, .••• 
(X) 
Let V. (s0 , µ) = I f3t V~{s0 , µ), then Vi. (s0 , µ) represents the total expected 
1. t=O 1. , 
discounted payoff to player i when the play starts in s0 and the players use 
stationary strategyµ EN. 
Note that lvi(s,µ)I is uniform bounded by 1~8, for from assumption A4 
it follows that lv~(s,µ)I ~ M, so that IV.(s,µ)I ~ I f3t I V~(s,µ)I ~ 1~ 0 • 
1. 1. t=O 1. µ 
* DEFINITION: An elementµ E N is called an equilibrium point iff 
* -i* V.(s,µ) ~ V.(s,(µ ,µ.)), Vµ. EN., Vi EI, Vs 
l. l. l. l. l. 
-i* E S, where (µ · , µi) de-
notes the joint stationary strategy with player i playingµ. and the other 
l. 
* players playing according toµ • 
In section 2 we show the existence of an equilibrium point for the game 
r as specified above, within the class of stationary strategies. 
4 
In section 3 we show that this point 1.s also equilibrium point in the most 
general class of strategies, namely the class of behavioral strategies. 
An extension of the model presented here is earlier studied by SOBEL 
[10] and FEDERGRiiN [5]. The extension concerns the state space. They both 
considered a compact state space. Sobel's set of players is arbitrary and 
Federgriin's set of players is finite. However they both made a mistake in 
their proofs of the existence of an equilibrium point and for both it holds 
that it is very hard to rectify their proofs, if possible. Therefore now-
adays it is unclear whether and under which conditions there exists an equi-
librium point in a stochastic game model with the state space uncountable. 
When in the model of Federgriin we take the statespace countable then his 
proof goes on. When we do the same in Sobel's method then there must be 
made further restrictions on the other game parameters to come to the exis-
tence of an equilibrium point. 
One of the main reasons why we present our method is that 1.n our proof we 
do not need to use a selection theorem. By D the end of a proof will be 
denoted. 
2. EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM POINT WITHIN THE CLASS N. 
We start with two continuity lemma's. 
LEMMA 2.1. For every function f(.,.) E V(SA) the function f(s,µ(s)) defined 
on SN == { ( s , µ ( s) ) I µ ( s) E N ( s) } as 
f(s,µ(s)) = J f(s,a(s)) dµ(s) is for each s ES 
A(s) 
a continuous function in µ(s) on N(s). 
PROOF. For fixed s ES the proof is analogue to the proof of Lemma 2.2 in 
VRIEZE [ll], which is an extension of the proof of Lemma 2.1 in PARTHASARATHY 
& MAITRA [8], which is also used by FEDERGRu.N [5]. 
Therefore the proof will not be repeated here. D 
LEMMA 2.2. The total expected discounted payoff function V.(s,µ) for player 
l. 
i is for fixed s a continuous function on N, Vs ES, Vi EI. 
5 
PROOF: The proof 1s quite analogue to the proof of Lennna 2.2 in FEDERGRiiN 
[SJ. However, as a referee of his paper pointed out, because their strategy 
space is an uncountable product of metrisable topological spaces, the pro-
duct topology of this space need not be characterized by sequences, so for 
his case the proof of Lemma 2.2 fails. 
However, in our case the product topology of the strategy space 1s charac-
terized by sequences as we already pointed out in section I, so in our 
case the proof of his Lemma 2.2 can be applied and will therefore not be 
repeated here. D 
We now define a mapping T: N + N (analogue to the mapping Tin VRIEZE 
[II]) which is the key to the proof of the existence of an equilibrium point 
within the class N. 
In assumption A3 we stated that Ai(s) is a compact subset of some metric 
space so there exists a countable subset d. (s) = {d. (s), n = 1,2, .•• } c A. (s), 1 1n 1 
which lies dense in A.(s) (cf. ROYDEN [9], proposition 13, page 163). 
1 
Let A~ E N.(s) be the probability measure on A.(s) such that 1 1 1 s -n s . A.(d. (s)) = 2 , n = 1,2, ... , so A. 1s concentrated on d.(s). 1 1n 1 1 
Chooseµ EN and let V.(s,µ) be the total expected discounted payoff to 
1 
player i when the game starts in states. 
V.(s,µ) satisfies: 
1 
2.1. V/s,µ) = gi(s,µ(s)) + sf V/s',µ)p(ds'ls,µ(s)), Vs ES 
s 
This can be seen from e.g. BLACKWELL [2], page 231, DENARDO [3], page 166. 
Let 
2.2. y . ( s , µ , a . (s) ) 
1 1 
-1 = g.(s,(µ (s),a.(s)) + 
1 1 
+ f3 J V.(s',µ)p(ds' ls,(µ-i(s),a.(s))) 1 1 
s 




Here(µ (s),ai(s)) is the joint action in states where player i plays ai and 
the other players play according to µ(s). Note that y.(s,µ,a.(s) is the total 
1 1 
expected discounted payoff to player i if the play starts in states, the 
joint players action in this starting state is (µ-i(s),a.(s)) and after the 
1 
first step the players play according toµ. 
I -1 From assumption A5 and Lemma 2.1 we see that p(s' s,(µ (s),ai(s))) for 
fixed s',s and a.(s) is a continuous function in µ(s) (inµ) on N(s) (on N). 
1 
Since V.(s,µ) is continuous inµ and uniform bounded we may apply proposition 
1 . 
18, page 232 of ROYDEN [9] on the expression f V.(s',µ)p(ds' ls,(µ- 1 (s),a.(s))) 
1 1 
s 
to conclude that this expression is continuous inµ on N for fixed 
s E S,a.(s) E A.(s). 
1 1 , 
From assumption A5 and Lemma 2.1 it follows that g.(s,(µ- 1 (s),a.(s))) 1 1 
is continuous inµ for fixed s ES and a.(s) E A.(s), and so we may conclude 
1 1 
that y.(s,µ,a.(s)) is continuous inµ on N for fixed s ES and a.(s) E A.(s). 
1 1 1 1 
In the same way we can show that y.(s,µ,a.(s)) is a continuous function in 
1 1 
a.(s) on A.(s) for fixed s ES andµ EN. 
1 1 
Let 
2.3. qi.(s,µ,a.(s)) = max{ O,y.(s,µ,a.(s)) - V.(s,µ)}, 
1 1 1 1 1 
Let 
2.4. \P. (s,µ,H) 
1 = J 
H 
Vs ES, Va.(s) E A(s), Vi EI 
1 
s qi.(s,µ,a.(s))dA. = 
1 :t 1 I d(s)EH 
in 
Vs ES, 
s qi. (s,µ,d. (s))L (d. (s)) 
1 in 1 in 
VH E M.(s), Vi EI 
1 
The mapping T N ➔ N will now be defined as: 
2.5. 
µ.(s)(H) + \P,(s,µ,H) 
(Tµ). (s) (H) = - 1 ------1--..,....,... 
1 1 + \P,(s,µ,A.(s)) 
1 1 
, Vs ES, VH E M.(s), Vi EI. 
1 
We now succesively prove two properties of this mapping T. 
PROPERTY 
PROPERTY 2 
For everyµ EN we have Tµ EN. 
T: N ➔ N is a continuous mapping and possesses at least 
one fixed point. 
Proof of Property 1: From (2.5) we see that (Tµ).(s)(.) is a probability 1. 
measure on A.(s) defined for each Borel subset HE M.(s), so it follows 
1 1. 
that Tµ EM. D 
7 
Proof of Property 2: We have already shown that y. (s,µ,a. (s)) is continuous 1. 1. 
in µ for fixed s E s and a. (s) E A. (s) and that y. (s,µ,a. (s)) is continuous 1. 1. 1. 1. 
in a. (s) for fixed S E s andµ E N. 
1. 
In exactly the same way as the proof of property ] in VRIEZE [ 11] it follows 
that ~.(s,µ,a.(s)) is continuous inµ and a.(s), next that ~.(s,µ,H) 1.s con-1. 1. 1. 1. . 
tinuous inµ for each s ES, HE M.(s) and from the definition (2.5) we then 
1. 
see that (Tµ).(s)(.) is 1. continuous 1.n the weak topology inµ on N, for 
Vs ES, Vi EI. So if µn + µ0 on Nin the product topology, then Tµn + Tµ 0 
on Nin the product topology. Applying the Schauder-Tychonoff Theorem (e.g. 
DUNFORD & SCHWARTZ [4], page 456) gives us then the existence of a fixed 
point in N for the above defined mapping T. 
A more detailed version of this proof one can find in VRIEZE [11] (proof of 
Property 1) • D 
THEOREM 2.I. : The stochastic gamer= (I,S,A,g,p) under the assumptions 
A1 ,A2 ,A3 ,Al+ and A5 possesses an equilibrium point within the class of sta-
tionary strategies. 
* PROOF : Letµ be fixed point of the above defined mapping T. And let 
* V. (s, µ ) bi~ the payoff to player i when play starts in state s. 
1. 
We are going to prove: 
* * * Tµ = µ ¢."> µ is equilibrium point, 
Quite analogue to VRIEZE [11] (proof of Property 2) it follows that 
2.6. * Tµ * = µ 
We should prove: 
·* 
( *) max { ( ( -1. ( ) ( ) ) ) ~Vis,µ = a.(s)EA.(s) gi s, µ s ,ai s + 
1. 1 
·* * I -1. V.(s',µ )p(ds' s,(µ (s),a.s)))} 
1. 1 
Vs ES, Vi EI. 
8 
2.7. µ* equilibrium point ~ 
·* -1 * V.(s,µ) = 
1 
max {g.(s,(µ (s),a.(s))) + 




Vs E S, Vi E I. 
. * Fix the strategies of all the players onµ except for playerci. Then we can 
in the usual way define a Markovian decision problem for player i, namely: 
Statespace S, pure action space A.(s) in states ES, immediate payoff 
-i* 1 
g.(s,(µ (s),a.(s))) in states when he plays pure action a.(s) and transi-
1 1 "* .1 
tion probabilities p(s' ls,(µ- 1 (s),a.(s))). 
1 
It is only a matter of substitution to see that, if player i plays in the 
above Markovian decision problem stationary strategyµ. E Ni, then he yields 
1 • 
a payoff W.(s,µ.) which is the same as the payoff V.(s,(µ- 1 *,µ.)), which 
1 1 1 1 
he would get if in the gamer player i playsµ. &nd the other players play-
1 
* ing according toµ • 
BLACKWELL [2] has shown that for the above mentioned Markovian decision pro-
blem a stationary strategy is then and only then optimal for the discounted 
criterium if his payoff satisfies the optimality criterium. 
So hereµ. EN. is optimal for the above Markovian decision problem if£: 
1 1 
·* 2.8. W.(s,µ.) = 
1 1 
-1 
max , {g. (s, (µ ,a. (s))) + 
1 1 a. (s)EA. (s) 
1 1 
·* 
W.(s,µ.)p(ds' ls,(µ- 1 ,a.(s)))} 
1 1 1 
Vs ES 
·* -1 
As W.(s,µ.) = V.(s,(µ ,µ.)) we see from (2.6) and (2.8) that: 
1 1 1 1 
2.9. * Tµ * = µ 
is optimal for his Markovian decision problem when the other players are 
-i* fixed atµ , Vi EI. 
So from (2.9) we see: 
2. 1 o. * Tµ * = µ 
which is the same as 
* * * Tµ = µ ~ µ 
·* -1. * 
= V. (s, (µ ,µ.)) = l. l. 
·* -1. 
= V. (s, (µ , µ.)), l. l. 
equilibrium point. 0 
3. EXTENSION TO GENERAL STRATEGY SPACES 
* W.(s,µ.) ~ W.(s,µ.) = l. l. l. l. 
Vi E I , Vµ . E N • • l. l. 
In this section we impose milder condition on the parameter of the 
gamer= (I,S,A,g,P). 
I is an arbitrary set of players. 
Sis an arbitrary state space, with defined an arbitrary a-algebra 
BS on it. 
A= X X A.(s), where A.(s), the set of pure actions for player 
SES iEI l. l. 
i in states, is an arbitrary space. 
9 
g = {g. I i EI} where g. is the payoff function for player i, i.e. if l. l. 
in states ES the joint players action is a(s) E X A.(s), then g. 
. I I. I. l.E 
specifies an immediate payoff g.(s,a(s)) to player i. The only condition l. 
on the g. 's is · sup I g. (s,a(s)) I = M. 
1 ISA 1 ' , 
P = {p(Hls,a(s))I VH E B8 , Vs ES, Va(s) E X A.(s)} Pis the set . I I. l.E 
of transition probabilities, i.e. if in states the joint players 
actions are a(s) E X A.(s), then P specifies probabilities p(H I s,a(s)) 
. I I. l.E 
for each set HE BS i.e. p(Hls,a(s)) is the probability that the next 
state belongs to H if in states joint action a(s) has taken place. 
No further condition on Pis made. 
What we intend to do in this section is the following: 
Assume that in the stochastic game model specified by B1,B2,B3,B4 and B5 , 
we have found in the discounted case an equilibrium point within a later 
10 
to be specified subclass of the stationary strategies then we show that this 
point is also equilibrium point in the most general class of strategies. 
So there is specified a discount factor 8 E [0,1). Let M.(s) be a a-algebra 
l. 
on A.(s), Vi EI, Vs ES. Let A(s) = X A.(s) and let M(s) be the product 
l. iEI l. 
a-field on A(s). Let N.(s) be the set of probability measures on A.(s) de-
1. l. 
fined for each BE M.(s). Let N(s) = X N.(s). N(s) is the set of product 
l. iEI l. 
probability measures defined on the product a-field M(s). 
An element µ.(s) E N.(s) should be viewed as a randomized action for player 
l. l. 
i in states and an element µ(s) E N(s) should be viewed as a joint action 
of the players in states. 
Let ht be the history of the game until time t, i.e. 
where a(s.) E X A.(s.) 
J iEI 1 J 
We are now going to define the most general strategy space for the players. 
As a result of AUMANN [l] we may restrict ourselves to behavioral strategies, 
without loss of any generality, when we quite naturaly assume that the play 
is of perfect recall, i.e. each player remembers at every time t the whole 
history ht and knows exactly in what state st he is. 
A behavioral strategy for player i is a strategyµ. which specifies 
l. 
for each t, each history h and each state st an element µ.(t,h ,s) E N.(s ). t l. t t l. t 
Let IT. be the set of all strategies for player i and let IT= X IT .• 
l. iEI l. 
Then an elementµ of IT should be viewed as a joint strategy for the players 
and µ(t,ht,st) E N(st). 
If µ.(t,ht,s) E IT. depends for every t through h only on s0 , so 1 t 1 t 
µ.(t,h ,st)= µ.(t,s 0,s ), then we speak of a semi-markov strategy for 1 t 1 t 
player i. If µ.(t,h ,s) E IT. depends for every t not on ht, so 
1 t t 1 
µi(t,ht,st) = µi(t,st), then we speak of a Markov strategy. 
If µ.(t,ht,st) E IT. depends only on s , so µ.(t,ht,s) = µ.(st), then we 
1 l. t 1 t 1 
speak of a stationary strategy. 
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of stationary 
strategies for player i and the set X N.(s). 
SES l. 
It is easy to see that when we take an arbitraryµ E IT then we get great 
measurability and integrability difficulties with the calculation of the 
] 1 
expected payoff to player i, Vi E I. Following DENARDO p] page 175, we 
therefore use the following trick. Let T be an arbitrary topological space: 
let f(.) bE~ an arbitrary function on this space T and let p(.) be a proba-
bility measure on this space T, defined for each Borel subset B c T. Let 
K(T,f(.),p(.)) = {v Iv: T ➔ JR'; f(t) ~ v(t), \ft ET and v(.) 
is integrable on T with respect top(.)} 
We now define: 
3. 1. I f(t) dp(t) -
T 
inf I v(t) dp(t). 
VEK(T,f(.),p(.)) T 
In what follows all integrals used are meant in the sense of 3.1. 
Let µ(-(s 0 ,a0 (s0))) be the joint stationary strategy generated byµ E TI, 
defined as: 
where ((sO,aO(sO)),ht) is a history consisting of t+l -states and t+l 
-joint actions, \fs 0 E s, \fao<so) E X A. (s0), Vi E I. . I i iE 
Define for each s E s and each i E I a sequence of mappings 







Zt-l (µ(-(s,a(s)))p(ds' ls, a(s))} dµ(O,h0 ,s) 
Ifµ is such, that every integral, which appears in the sequence {Z~i(µ)} 
can be calculated without making use of the sense (3.1) then we see that 
Z~i(µ) equals the expected payoff to player i at the t th step if the play 
starts in states and the players joint strategy is ii E IT. 
M,\THE;,,~,\, ,,, - . , 
-AMS TE ii DAM--
12 
Now in general we define the expected payoff to player i as 
. n . 
Zs 1 (µ) = lim I StZ~ 1 (µ) when the play starts in states ES and the 
n--)<)O t=O 
joint player's strategy isµ E IT. As 
sup jg. (s,a(s)) I :::; M, it follows that izsti(µ) I :::; Mand 
I t' A i , i.), 
1zs1(µ)j :::; l~S • Vs ES, Vi EI, Vµ E IT. 
The concept of equilibrium point will be defined in the usual way 
* DEFINITION: An elementµ E IT is called an equilibrium point iff 
si -i* si * 
Z ( µ , µ.) ~; Z ( µ ) , Vs E S, Vi E I, Vµ . E IT. , 
1 1 1 
-i* 
where (µ ,µ .. ) is the joint strategy where player i playsµ. and the 
1. 1 
other players play according toµ * 
Now we are able to state our main theorem of this section: 
THEOREM 3, I. Let Q be a class of stationa,ry joint strategies for the 
players with t;he property that if µ E Q, then also (µ -i ,ai) E Q, 
Va. E x8A. (s). Ifµ* E Q is an equilibrium point within this class Q., then 1 SE 1 
µ* is ;,n equiUbriwn point within the most general class of strategies TI. 
Before proving this theorem we prove a useful lemma. 
. ·* S1 -1. 
LEMMA 3.1. Let W.(s) == sup Z (µ ,µ.), 1. µ. E TI. 1 
obeys theorem 3.1. l 1. 
Then W.(s) satisfies the equation: 
1. 
3.4. W. (s) = 
1. 
* Vi EI, Vs ES, whereµ 
·* 
+ sf W.(s')p(ds' ls,a(s))}d(µ-1. (s),a.(s))} Vs ES, Vi EI. 1. 1. 
s 
PROOF: First note that 
3.5. 
Vs e: S. 




SI. -1. e: 
Z (µ ,µ.) ~ W.(s) - e:, 
l. l. 
Vs E S, Vi E I. 
Since µ.(-(s,a(s))) e: TI. we see from (3.4) that 
l. l. 
3.7. 
' . . * s l. -1. Z (µ ,µ.(-(s,a(s)))) ~ W.(s'), 
l. l. 
Vµ . e: TI. , Vs e: S 
l. l. 
Va(s) e: A(s), Vie: I. 
Combining (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) yields: 
3.8. 
. ·* 
W.(s) - e: ~ Zs 1 ( -1. e:) 
l. µ 'µi ~ I {gi(s,a(s)) + 
A(s) 
I -1. e: I ·* + B Wi(s')p(ds' s,a(s))} d(µ (s),µi(O,hO,s)) 
s 
~ sup { f {gi(s,a(s)) + 
ai(s)e:Ai(s) A(s) 
13 
sf Wi(s ')p(ds'ls,a(s))}d(µ-i(s)~i(s)}'} Vs e: s, Vie: I 
s 
So one part of the leIIDD.a is proved. 
Consider now the expression: 
14 
3.9. 
. . * 
Sl. -1. Then Z (µ ,(µ.,a.(s))) represents the expected payoff to player i when 1. 1. 
play starts in states, player i plays in the first step pure action a.(s) 1. 
and after the first step he playsµ., while the other players 
1. 
play according 
* to µ during th,e whole game. So by (3.4). 
. ·* Sl. -1. 3.10. Z (µ ,(µ.,a.(s)):::; W.(s), 1. 1. 1. 
£ Choose nowµ. such that: 1. 
I • • * 
Va . ( s ) E A . ( s ) , Vµ . E II. • 1. 1. 1. 1. 
3. 1 l • 
s 1. -1. £ Z (µ ,(µ.(-(s,a(s)))) ~ W.(s') - £, Vs' ES, 1. 1. Vs ES, 
Va(s) E A(s), Vi EI. 
Combining (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11) yields: 
3.12. W.(s) 1. 
s 
·* J {gi (s,a(s) 
A(s) 
+ sf W.(s')p(ds'ls,a(s))}d(µ-1. (s),a.(s)) 1. 1. - £ 
s 
Va.(s) E A(s), Vs ES, Vi EI. 
1. 
So from (3.12) we can conclude 
3.13. W.(s) + e 1. ~ sup { I {gi(s,a(s)) + 
ai (s) EA(s) A(s) 
sfwi(s 1 )p(ds' !s,a(s))} d(µ-i~s),ai(s))}, 
s 
Combining (3.8) and (3.13) proofs the lemma. 0 
Vs ES, Vi EI. 
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PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1 : Fix player i and choose E > O. 
From Lemma 3.1. we see that for each s there exists an a.(s) E A.(s) 
1 1 
such that: 
3.14. I {gi(s,a(sH"+ efwi(s')p(ds'ls,a(s))}d(µ-i*(~),ai(s)) ~ Wi(s) - e(l-e). 
A(s) S 
·* I -1 Let Q. = {µ. µ. EN. and(µ ,µ.) 
1 1 1 1 1 
E Q}, so by the assumption on Qin 
Theorem 3.1. we have Q. ~ X A.(s). 
1 S 1 SE 
Let µ7 be the stationary strategy for player i which prescribes to play 
1 
E action a. (s) in state s, where a. (s) obeys (3.14), so µ. E Q· .• 
1 1 1 l. 





Substitution of the left side of (3.15) for W.(s') in the left side of 
1 
(3.14) yields : 
3. 16. 
I I ·* I -1. E + S W. (s")p(ds" s' ,a(s'))d(µ (s'),µ. (s') + 
1 l. 
A(s) S 
·* I -1. E + E(l-S)} p(ds' s,a(s))d(µ (s),µ.(s)) ~ W.(s)- e(l-S). 
1 1 · 





I 2 (Wi)(s) I I I I Wi(s")p(ds"l''s',a(s'))d(µ-i~s'),µ~(s')) 
A(s) S A(s) S 
·* I -1. e: p(ds' s,a(s))d(µ (s),µ.(s)) 
l. 
In the same way it is easy to prove by induction that: 
3.18. 
k t 
W.(s) - e:(1-B) l B 
1 t=O 
Since IW. (s) I ~ M, it follows I Ik+l (W.) (s) I ~ M, 
l. l. 
Vs E S, Vk. 
As. 
we see from 3.18 that 
. . * 
3.19. ZSl.( -1. e:) W () µ ,µi ~ is - e:, 
. ·* Sl. -1. e: z (µ ,µ.), 
l. 
Vs ES, 
e: So for every e: > 0 there exists a µi E Qi such that (3.19) holds. 
Therefore we may conclude: 





. ·* Sl. -1. 









* As i was arbitrary chosen (3.20) holds for every i EI, so we see thatµ 
is also equilibrium point within the class IT. D 
* THEOREM 3.2. The equilibrium pointµ EN as found in section 2 for the 
gamer= (I,S,A,g,P) under the conditions A1,A2,A3,A4 and AS within the 
class N, is also equilibrium point in the most general strategy class for 
that game. 
PROOF: As the conditions B1,B2,B3,B4 and BS are all weaker than respecti-
vely A1 ,A2 ,A3,A4 and AS and as N satisfies the condition on Q in Theorem 
3.1, we may apply theorem 3.1. D 
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